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Abstract: We present a secure network communication system that
operated with decoy-state quantum cryptography in a real-world application
scenario. The full key exchange and application protocols were performed
in real time among three nodes, in which two adjacent nodes were con-
nected by approximate 20 km of commercial telecom optical fiber. The
generated quantum keys were immediately employed and demonstrated
for communication applications, including unbreakable real-time voice
telephone between any two of the three communication nodes, or a broad-
cast from one node to the other two nodes by using one-time pad encryption.
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1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography can in principle offer the first provable unconditional security between
communication parties, which is guaranteed by fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, rather
than unproven computational assumptions. The last two decades have witnessed dramatic ad-
vances in both theoretical developments and successful experimental demonstration of quantum
cryptography systems, see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] to name a few of them. Based on
these attractive progresses, several companies (such as IdQuantique, MagiQ and SmartQuan-
tum) have commercially developed quantum cryptography prototypes, which bring quantum
cryptography into practical applications by integrating with current encryption and decryption
techniques. In practice, however, the security of a specific setup is not automatically ensured
due to various imperfections. Most of today’s commercially available quantum cryptography
systems rely on photon sources from attenuated laser pulses, which forms a tremendous secu-
rity threaten for such systems. This is because weak coherent pulse sources contain two or more
photons per pulse with a non-vanishing probability, leaving the systems susceptible a beam
splitter attack from a formidable eavesdropper. The photon number splitting attack is in fact the
main security threat of practical QKD schemes [11, 12]. Rigorous security analysis on practi-
cal quantum key distribution (QKD) system is proposed by Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill
[13]. and Inamori-Lu¨tkenhaus-Mayers [14]. However, the results are not optimal, which can
guarantee only a very limited key generation rates and distances for a practical quantum cryp-
tography system.
Recent revolutionary progress has been achieved by introducing the idea of decoy state [15],
and by turning the idea into systematical and rigorous theory and scheme in [16] and [17].
By using decoy state within the common setup, one can obtain much higher key generation
rates and longer distances (typically from less than 30 km, to more than 100 km), in the same
level compared with the case of using true single photon sources [17]. This leads to firstly
successful experimental demonstrations by Lo’s group from Canada [18] for 15 km, and further
for 60km [19]. Then implementations for more than 100 km are almost simultaneously realized
by research groups from China [20], America [21] and Europe [22]. Also an implementation
for 25.3 km is achieved by Toshiba’s group from UK [23].
So far most research groups all over the world have put forward QKD links, however, oper-
ating in a point-to-point mode only, rather than networks with multiple users. This has greatly
restricted the domain of applicability of quantum cryptography, which enjoys the extremely
high security standard. Subtle design and appropriate network topology are needed to be ef-
fectively integrated into existing data networks to achieve a high key generation rate and long
distance for a secure communication network.
Phoenix et al. [24] proposed the idea of passive quantum networks by using passive opti-
cal components, which can realize QKD between one user to any other user in the network.
Townsend et al. [25] demonstrated that QKD is feasible between any user to any other one
within a passive quantum network. However, photons are split by couplers according to their
ratio which nevertheless sacrifices greatly the actual key generation rate. By using a network
controller that actively controls optical switches [26], the first quantum cryptography network,
DARPA (The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ) quantum network, became oper-
ational since 2004 [27, 28]. One node contains an active 2-by-2 optical switch that can be used
to actively switch between two network topologies. This network currently links the campuses
of BBN Technologies, Harvard University and Boston University (BU), with distances of ap-
proximately 10 km for both BBN-Harvard span and BBN-BU span. In 2006 the NIST group
also demonstrated a three-user active quantum cryptography network with one transmitter us-
ing optical switches and two receivers, each connected to transmitter by 1 km fiber links [29].
Over 1 Mbps sifted-key rate was claimed to be generated in either link. The European SEC-
OQC (Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography) quantum network [30] has
initiated since 2004 and currently claims to have 4 nodes in Vienna city for a fiber ring network
of approximately 63 km and one additional node which is 85 km far from the ring. It is based
on the trusted relay paradigm [30]. It mostly focuses on an architecture allowing integration
of heterogeneous QKD-link devices. One node with decoy state device is also included in the
tested network. Recently Chen et al. implemented a four-user quantum cryptography network
by taking star topology based on wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) [31]. It was built in
the commercial backbone telecom fiber network in Beijing with the longest length of 42.6 km
for fibers between two nodes.
The DARPA network [27, 28] realized the first quantum cryptography network with 3 node,
while the European SECOQC quantum network [30] gives the first implementation of inte-
grated heterogeneous QKD-link devices. At the mean time, the NIST network [29] gives very
high sifted-key rate in a short distance network, while the quantum network in Beijing [31]
gives longest length between two nodes. These progresses are quite significant and represent
big steps toward a secure QKD network. However, there exist still big gaps from a practical
quantum cryptograph network. Without using decoy state, a prototype setup cannot achieve
secure distance of more than 30 km generally [17, 14] with the standard BB84 protocol. The
implemented DARPA network [28], the NIST network [29] and the network realized in [31] are
all without using decoy states. Therefore, these network, in fact, either are not secure, or can-
not accomplish the performance mentioned in their experiments. In addition, the distance for
secure network communication are quite short, namely, less than 10 km in the case of DARPA
network and only 1 km for NIST network.
In this article, we present a three-user network communication system based on decoy-state
quantum cryptography in a typical application scenario. In the experiment, it is possible to
create secure quantum keys on demand among USTC (University of Science and Technology
of China), Binhu, and Xinglin that are located in Hefei city of China. As shown in Fig. 1, the
USTC node acts as a trusted relay and constitutes a chained QKD architecture together with
Binhu, and Xinglin. The telecom fiber strand is approximately 20 km for USTC-Binhu while it
is also approximately 20 km for USTC-Xinglin. The produced keys were directly handed over
to an application that was used to process real-time voice telephone between any two users of
the three nodes. We have developed secure communication network system including both the
QKD link modules and the audio application module based on quantum keys. All of optical,
electronical controlling, data acquisition and processing system are integrated into one single
box as a transmitter or a receiver. Successful real-time secret audio communication has been
performed between any two users of the three nodes with the quantum keys through one-time
Fig. 1. Chained network architecture of our quantum cryptography network. Two sets of
decoy-state QKD systems are installed for Binhu-USTC link and USTC-Xinglin link, re-
spectively. The QKD systems have been updated in a large degree to match seamless inte-
gration with real-time audio communication by using one-time pad encryption, among the
three nodes. The red dashed line indicates the fiber running out of the map.
pad encryption [32]. An interphone has also been accomplished when one implements a secure
broadcast again by using one-time pad encryption from one node to the other two nodes, or the
other way around.
Compared with prior results, we provide a complete, compact, low cost 3-node QKD net-
work system in a real-life situation. Our motivation and results are three-fold. Firstly we focus
on a practical QKD network with decoy state. The trusted-relay architecture we used is proved
to be very practical and is extensively used such as in DARPA network and the SECOQC
network. It has many advantages [30] such as feasibility with today’s technologies (not rely-
ing on unavailability of quantum repeater), allowing for longer distance compared with optical
switch based network etc [30]. At the mean time, decoy state method can, in a large degree,
increase the key generation rate with guaranteed unconditional security. Secondly we have fo-
cused on developing a complete system, with virtues of low cost and compact, reliable and
integrated components, rather than only an experimental demonstration. This would help to
bring a commercial QKD network system closer. Thirdly, we focused on real-life application,
such as real time two-way audio communication and one-way broadcast, by utilizing one-time
pad encryption and decryption. The pseudo-random numbers are not used in our system as they
are normally used in a Gigahertz QKD system [33], due to lack of a random number genera-
tors in the Gigahertz level. Rather we use the true random number generators in every place
for the system, and has achieved practical applications with unconditional security. In addition,
we use the InGaAs-type detectors with a small volume rather than upconversion [34, 35] or
superconducting nanowire detectors [9]. The latter two detectors have the advantage of high
SignalLaserIM
SYN IN
......
WDM
. . .. . .
SYN OUT
Transmitter Receiver
WDM
D1
D0
PC
PM
PM
PS
AT
20km Fiber in City
BS PBS
PBS
BS
Fig. 2. Sketch of the experimental setup for one QKD-link. With a random choice of
measurement basis controlled by the phase modulator at the MZ interferometer in Bob’s
side, Bob has 1/2 probability to have correct basis choice. Both sides can then obtain sifted
keys after comparison, which are used for further error correction, privacy amplification ac-
cording to decoy state QKD mechanism. The classical communication channel is realized
via a standard TCP/IP connection in our setup. Here, IM (PM): intensity (phase) modulator;
BS: beam splitter; AT: controllable attenuator; SYN: synchronized signal; PC: polarization
controller; PS: phase shifter; D: single-photon detector; PBS: polarizing beam splitter.
repetition rate for detection, but with a very large volume. Moreover high background count
rate is accompanied with the upconversion detector, while superconducting detectors require
cryogenic cooling. The InGaAs-type detector thus provides an ideal choice for our compact,
low cost practical QKD network systems.
2. Experimental setup
Due to the currently lowest dispersion and attenuation for optical fiber at the telecom wave-
length, we implement our setup in a real-life situation by using the running fiber network of
China Netcom Group Corp Ltd. The laser sources in our quantum cryptography system are
produced from distributed feedback (DFB) diodes with a center wavelength of 1550.12 nm and
pulse duration of 1 ns. By a random attenuation through a fiber intensity modulator for the
DFB laser, one thus creates the needed weak coherent signal, decoy pulses and vacuum for this
quantum cryptography setup. In our system, there is a transmitter box in Binhu and a receiver
box in Xinglin, while in USTC there are both a transmitter box and a receiver box. Every box
has integrated full functions for control of QKD hardware, execution of QKD protocol mod-
ule and seamless interchange with our audio communication application. This design can thus
constitute two QKD links simultaneously between Binhu and USTC, and between USTC and
Xinglin. A repetition rate of 4 MHz is used for the laser source. This is because true random
number generators can only work at this level of rate for a commercially available product. We
adopt in this experiment phase encoding method for finishing QKD tasks.
For key generation, in transmitter’s side the photon pulse is firstly sent to an time division
fiber Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometer with the long arm through a phase modulator to gen-
erate the four primary signal states necessary for implementing the BB84 [1] protocol of a
QKD system. Here we use the polarizing beam splitters and beam splitters in both Alice’s and
Bob’s sides, such that photons from Alice’s short arm are directed into Bob’s long arm and vice
versa [5]. This would avoid a 3dB loss for useful photons in the normal case of Mach-Zehnder
(MZ) interferometers where only beam splitters are used. By using an attenuator through suit-
able attenuation, one can control the photon number intensity to be 0.65/pulse for signal states,
and 0.08/pulse for decoy states for USTC-Xinglin link, while they are 0.60/pulse for signal
states, and 0.20/pulse for decoy states for Binhu-USTC link. A synchronization laser pulse
at the wavelength of 1310 nm was then combined with the signal and decoy states, through
a wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) apparatus, into the installed single-mode telecom
fiber for transmission. After passing through the 20 km long dark fiber, at receiver’s side the
synchronization information encoded in the fiber is firstly read out through another WDM appa-
ratus. Finally a clock signal synchronized with transmitter is formed, which will further control
correspondingly the measurement basis choice for the phase modulator located in the unbal-
anced fiber MZ interferometer in receiver’s side. In addition, this synchronization clock signal
will also act as the gate control signal for the InGaAs-type detectors D0 and D1. The whole
synchronization electronics, detection logic and signal acquisition are all integrated in a single
board by using a field programmable gate array (FPGA) and running at a sampling frequency
of 4 MHz. The detectors are running in gating mode while the gate width is set to be 2 ns to
match our laser source. For our detectors, the “after pulse” will generally increase the error rate
of the raw key. The after pulse probability for the detectors used in our setup will decrease to
about 8/1000 if we set dead time be 20µs. This is in the same level of duration for dead time
if compared with a recent experiment [36], in which where a dead time of 30µs is used. Thus
we have set dead time for all detectors be 20µs, and simultaneously match the detection events.
The true dark counts rate for the detectors themselves are all about 1.0×10−5/pulse. The meas-
ured value from vacuum decoy state for dark counts rate Y0 is about 1.0× 10−4/pulse due to
finite extinction ratio for intensity modulator, affect of the “after pulse” for detectors, and the
intrinsic dark counts. The detection efficiency for all the detectors are greater than 10%.
The telecom single mode fiber has an average attenuation of about 0.2 dB per kilometer
resulting in a total attenuation of 4.5 dB including the connectors for Binhu and USTC span,
and 5.6 dB for USTC and Xinglin span. To keep the identical and good coherent property
for photons after propagating along the long distance fiber, a voltage-driven fiber polarization
controller is used to dynamically adjust polarizations for the transmitted states according to
total detection rates. This active compensation technique finally urges that photons from Alice’s
short arm are directed into Bob’s long arm and vice versa. To remove system’s intrinsic phase
fluctuation in the MZ interferometers at both sides, we have used a phase shifter to compensate
the phase difference dynamically. This is accomplished by implementing a feedback control
to stabilize the phase. Specifically we have inserted another pulsed laser (not shown in Fig. 2)
with the same central wavelength of 1550.12 nm as a reference during the idle gap between two
signal pulses, and making continuous active control of the MZ interferometer arm lengths.
For satisfying the necessary requirements for decoy state QKD system, we used true random
number generators produced by IdQuantique (type: Quantis-OEM, which has passed the NIST
and Diehard randomness tests). These random number generators are integrated in our con-
trolling electronics: a) to process random attenuation of laser source for producing signal and
decoy states; b) to load in the phase modulator in transmitter’s side for generating the needed
four possible states for QKD system; and c) to load in the phase modulator in receiver’s side
for forming the needed two possible measurement basis for QKD system.
3. Secure key generation and applications
In this section, we present typical characters supplied by our experimental network commu-
nication system. Besides the transmission loss in the fiber, there are also other coupling and
connection losses, in particular an approximate 3.5 dB due to the inserting loss for the polar-
ization maintaining fiber in receiver’s side. The BB84 protocol contributes an additional 3 dB
loss because there are only roughly one half of received photons encoding correct information.
It should be remarked that this loss can be avoided if one uses an asymmetric basis choice for
Alice and Bob [37]. Our setting for the proportion of three transmitted states is 6 : 1 : 1 among
the signal state, decoy state and vacuum state.
Before demonstrating our audio application among the three nodes, we have run and meas-
ured the average specifications that our system can achieve. Through a thirty-minute running,
we have obtained corresponding parameters for the two QKD links, and listed all the related
measurement and processing results in Table 1. The sifted key rates are archived to be more than
10.5 kbps for Binhu-USTC link and more than 9.0 kbps for USTC-Xinglin link. The quantum
bit error rate (QBER) is measured to be about 1.6% for Binhu-USTC link and about 1.4% for
USTC-Xinglin link. According to the systematical theory of decoy state QKD [16, 17, 38, 39],
we have developed a data post-processing unit to finish both error correction and privacy am-
plification in real time by considering finite key length and statistical fluctuation. For the imple-
mented algorithms themselves, we are mainly based on the result from the NIST group [40], by
noting that there is no decoy state in the NIST case. Currently we realize the algorithms using
software, while a FPGA implementation is more preferable in the future for high speed QKD
links. Consequently we can achieve a final secure key rate of more than 1.5 kbps for both links.
Table 1. Measured specification for QKD network system
link Communication wavelength QBER Sifted-key rate Final key rate
Binhu-USTC 1550.12nm ∼ 1.6% > 10.5 kbps > 1.6 kbps
USTC-Xinglin 1550.12nm ∼ 1.4% > 9.0 kbps > 1.5 kbps
We obtain the following key generation rate by using the result of [13, 17]
R≥ q{−Qµ f (Eµ)H2(Eµ)+Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
where the subscript µ is the average photon number per signal in signal states; Qµ and Eµ are
the measured gain and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for signal states, respectively; q is an
efficiency factor for the protocol. Q1 and e1 are the unknown gain and the error rate of the true
single photon state in signal states. To achieve maximum possible key generation rate, the decoy
state method can estimate the lower bound of Q1 denoting as QL1 , and the upper bound of e1
denoting as eU1 . Thus the decoy approaches could provide an unconditional security [16, 17] for
QKD systems. We follow here the method developed in [39, 19] to estimate good bounds for Q1
and e1, and using the stronger version for maximizing the key generation rate formula developed
in [13, 17]. The H2(x) is the binary entropy function: H2(x) =−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x),
while the factor f (x) is for considering an efficiency of the bi-directional error correction [41].
For convenience, we denote ν the average photon number per pulse for decoy state.
After experimentally measuring all the relevant parameters, we can input the following
bounds for calculating final key generation rate [39, 19]
Q1 ≥ QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν−ν2 (Q
L
νe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2 −Y
U
0
µ2−ν2
µ2 ), (2)
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EµQµ −YL0 e−µ/2
QL1
, (3)
in which
QLν = Qν(1−
10√
Nν Qν
),
Y L0 = Y0(1−
10√
N0Y0
),
YU0 = Y0(1+
10√
N0Y0
),
Here Nν , and N0 are numbers of pulses used as decoy state and vacuum state, respectively,
while Qν is the measured gain for the decoy states.
All the relevant parameters are listed in Table 2 for a typical running duration of 120s
for USTC-Xinglin link in our experiment. From Table (2), we see a final key rate of around
Table 2. Measured and derived specification for decoy state system
Para. Value Para. Value
Qµ 6.36× 10−3 Eµ 1.44× 10−2
Qν 8.61× 10−4 Eν 7.84× 10−2
QL1 2.72× 10−3 eU1 2.23× 10−2
R 4.10× 10−4 q 0.356
4M∗R= 1.7kbps is obtained for the typical running of our system. For achieving unconditional
security, we have estimated the bounds for QL1 and eU1 by considering the statistical fluctuations
for vacuum states, gains for signal states and decoy states within 10 standard deviations. Thus
the final keys rates is valid for finite key length and promises a confidence interval of about
1−1.5×10−23. We have performed privacy amplification by utilizing the universal2 functions
that are represented by Toeplitz matrices [42]. This finally improves both the efficiency and
speed in a large degree for privacy amplification, compared with the case that using purely
random matrices. It should be remarked that, to our knowledge, this is the first implementation
for both the error correction and privacy amplification, by considering statistical fluctuation for
decoy state quantum key distribution in a real-life application. There is actually a tradeoff be-
tween key generation rate and efficiency for privacy amplification. In our case we choose 120s
communication time for one time of executing privacy amplification for corrected raw keys.
One could certainly get faster realization for privacy amplification for shorter communication
time, then one is left with bigger statistical fluctuation and thus less key generation rate.
We have accumulated a final key of about 120Mbits and performed the NIST 800-22 ran-
domness test suite [43]. The sequence has passed all the test for a significance level of 0.8%,
with the minimum pass rate for each statistical test of 95%. Also the Diehard statistical test
suite [44] is performed. The reported p-value for the test are all between 0.009 and 0.989. Thus
there is very high confidence of 98.9% that our final keys are truly random. With sufficient large
data of keys, we hope to perform more extensive random test for our system in the future.
Based on these results, we have developed telephony terminal equipments through the nor-
mal analog commercial cable for telephony. The terminal has an ability to make one-time pad
encryption and decryption based on our QKD links, to process common voice telephone. The
audio compression ratio has arrived 0.6 kbps. In fact, our system can offer more than 1.2 kbps,
which is two times the keys needed for a one-way communication. Thus our system can of-
fer directly two-way telephony communication in real time. We have run the system for quite
a few minutes, and always get clear audio signal transmission with a good quality. After one
hour’s continuous running, we still found no decrease of voice quality, which shows that our
setup provides a very stable and robust secure network communication system. In fact, we have
tested the whole system for half a month in USTC for a telecom fiber of 20 km. There is no any
problem for the secure audio communication system.
An interphone system is further developed in our experiment, which provides a broadcast of
ciphered information from one user to any other two users with one-time pad encryption. Still
using about a quantity of 0.6 kbps keys, we have successfully tested and finished broadcasts
based on our telephony system, from any one of the Binhu, USTC and Xinglin nodes to any
other two nodes. If we need feedbacks from the other two nodes, it is not temporarily possible
for all the nodes due to the limited key generation rates. It is clear that it would need 1.2×
(N− 1) kbps quantum keys to process this task and to make all the two-way communications
simultaneously for N nodes.
4. Conclusion
In summary, the experiment reported here demonstrates an operational network communication
system, which allows real-time voice telephone between any two of the three communication
users, or a broadcast from one user to the other two users by using one-time pad encryption. The
chained network topology allows secret keys to be forwarded, in a hop-by-hop fashion, along
QKD links. Therefore unconditional authentication and encryption for information transmis-
sion by using one-time pad will become possible. The middle node acts as trusted relays and
increases the key generation rate in a large degree, compared with the case of direct connection
between the nodes with an exponential decreasing. Our setup can be easily expanded to many-
node network, and enjoys an advantage of slowly increasing for key’s need. Near future work
would cover improving the key generation rates, by employing high performance detectors and
high-speed true random number generators etc. We expect that it would be possible to finish
two-way audio communications in real time for QKD network with a few nodes. In the case that
the key rates is not enough for video conference with one-time pad encryption, we expect to
use classical symmetrical encryption algorithm such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
with a high refreshing rate of keys, and maintain a desired security level.
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